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EXPLAINING THE PUBLIC WARINESS OF JURIES
Albert W. Alschuler*
Michael Saks declares, "Negative public opinion about the jury is
paradoxical, because those condemning juries in opinion surveys are
sampled from essentially the same population from which juries are
drawn. How can the public's judgments in the latter role be so wrong,
and their judgments in the former role be so right?"1
A similar paradox infects Saks's paper, for this paper depicts the
public as ignoramuses when they offer views about extraterrestrials
and jurors to pollsters, and as sages once they enter the jury box. Of
course the roles of the public as survey respondents and as jurors are
different, and hearing the evidence at trial may transform the people
whose opinions Saks discredits, the people he would entrust with the
decision whether to bankrupt Texaco.
Saks lands nicely between the horns of his dilemma. I agree with
his conclusions that the public is ill-informed about the civil justice
system and that opinion polls provide a weak foundation for re-
shaping the role of the jury. Nevertheless, there are at least six rea-
sons for believing that the polls merit more credit than Saks gives
them.
I.
First, the Supreme Court has said repeatedly over the course of
more than fifty years, "[T]he proper functioning of the jury system,
and, indeed, our democracy itself, requires that the jury be a 'body
truly representative of the community.'- 2 We like to think of the jury
as the chorus in a Greek drama-a body chosen from the community
to render the community's judgment. Because this body represents all
of us, its pronouncements should command our respect. When mem-
* Wilson-Dickinson Professor, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful for the re-
search support of the Russell Baker Scholar's Fund at the University of Chicago Law School.
1. Michael J. Saks, Public Opinion About the Civil Jury: Can Reality Be Found in the Illu-
sions?, 48 DEPAUL L. Rnv. 221, 240 (1999).
2. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942) (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130
(1940)); see J.E.B. v. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1424 (1994); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 237
(1978); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970).
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bers of the public say, "Those bozos don't represent us," the jury falls
short of what we hope it can accomplish. 3
II.
Second, public criticism of the jury's performance is not truly para-
doxical. Saks suggests that members of the public may fail to see the
jury as themselves. The people who talk to pollsters may believe that
they are, like the children of Lake Woebegone, all above average. But
as Saks appears to acknowledge, the public who serve as jurors are
less educated than the norm, 4 and our skewing of the jury toward the
less-informed segment of the population is most evident in the high-
profile trials that most shape public impressions of the jury.5 Many
survey respondents may have little reason to see the jury as
themselves. 6
Moreover, public criticism of juries need not imply that the public
fails to recognize jurors as themselves or that "chutzpah" leads them
to believe that they could do better. Just as most members of the
public probably doubt that they would be capable ballet dancers or
capable Supreme Court justices,7 they may doubt that they are the
3. Saks suggests that opinion polls are most useful when opinion itself is what interests us-
for example, when we want to know whether consumers are confused by a product's brand
name. Saks, supra note 1, at 221-22. Saks apparently discounts opinion polls concerning the jury
on the ground that our concern is the reality of the jury's performance rather than how the
public perceives it. Because one commonly stated objective of the jury is reassuring the public
that the courts do justice, however, public opinion is important in itself. Negative opinion con-
cerning the jury may establish a jury failing even when this opinion is ill-informed.
4. See Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis
and Proposals for Reform, 28 ALA. L. REV. 441, 505 (1997).
5. See Albert W. Alschuler, Our Faltering Jury, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1996, at 28, 32-33.
6. Saks doubts that the public knows much about who serves on juries. Saks, supra note 1, at
224. The public need not know the formal qualifications of jurors, however, to sense that their
verdicts are sometimes odd and that the jurors themselves are sometimes odd in their post-
verdict television appearances.
Saks also contends that "as the one-day one-trial system of jury selection spreads across the
country, any discrepancy between the eligible community and those serving as jurors shrinks."
Id. at 224-25. I would be surprised, however, if the shrinkage were great. Especially when the
"one trial" for which veniremen are eligible is likely to be lengthy, the most educated prospec-
tive jurors may be the ones most anxious to escape. Judges may accommodate them. Moreover,
the most informed jurors are the ones most likely to have received disqualifying information
through the media. Finally, one party or both may eliminate the most knowledgeable jurors
through peremptory challenges. Cf. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lady Pollock, Apr.
11, 1897, in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTrERS 74 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941) ("The man who
wants a jury has a bad case .... ).
7. Senator Roman Hruska's defense of Supreme Court nominee G. Harold Carswell was not
Hruska's finest hour: "[T]here are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers. They are
entitled to a little representation, aren't they, and a little chance?" HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACK-
ING THE COURTS 48 (1988) (quoting Sen. Roman Hruska).
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appropriate judges of some issues now entrusted to juries. After giv-
ing their verdicts in complex cases, jurors themselves sometimes note
that they were not well equipped for the tasks assigned to them.
These jurors have emerged from their courtroom experience con-
fused, shell-shocked, and angry. 8
Even in less challenging cases, members of the public may sense
that they would confront a problem of first-order and second-order
preferences as jurors-the sort of problem that confronts an addict
who craves heroin but regrets craving it. If they confronted a plaintiff
whose suffering and whose needs were great and a defendant whose
pockets were deep, they might be tempted to overlook minor defects
in the plaintiff's case or to award excessive damages. Affected by the
pulls and emotions of a trial, these members of the public might care
less than they think they should about the effect of their awards on
taxes, budget deficits, insurance rates, and America's position in the
global economy. Although circumstances other than the depth of the
defendants' pockets may account for this phenomenon, 10 jury awards
appear to be influenced greatly by whether the defendant is an indi-
vidual, a government agency, or a corporation. 1 Awards also appear
to be influenced by the extent of the jurors' identification with the
plaintiff even when this identification rests partly on the plaintiff's
race.
12
III.
Third, public criticism of jury verdicts need not imply a negative
view of jurors. As Saks observes, one does not find in the polls any
8. See, e.g., STEVEN ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM
116-44 (1994).
9. Or that led Ulysses to order his sailors to bind him to the mast whenever the band played
the Paul Simon hit, "The Sounds of Sirens." (Sorry about that.) For an examination of the
significance of first-order and second-order preferences, see Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference
With Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1128 (1986).
10. See Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors' Treatment of Corporate Defend-
ants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327, 328 (1999) (suggesting that jurors do not consider the wealth of
defendants but do hold organizations to higher standards of responsibility than individuals); Neil
Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain and Suffering
in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217 (1993).
11. See AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS
IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS at viii-ix, 37-41 (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, 1985); Randall R.
Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice: Are Malpractice and Other Personal Injuries Created Equal?,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1991, at 5; James K. Hammitt et al., Tort Standards and Jury
Decisions, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 751 (1985). But see Vidmar, supra note 10.
12. See CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 11, at 43 tbl.4.5.
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significant support for scrapping the civil jury.' 3 The public probably
attributes flawed verdicts less to the failings of jurors themselves than
to lawyers' adversarial game-playing, the frequent truth-distortion
worked by evidentiary rules, the passive role assigned to jurors at trial,
the strange combination of silence and gobbledygook given jurors in
instructions, and the undue refinement of our courtroom procedures,
especially our jury selection procedures.
The same reasons that prompt Saks to question opinion polls may
lead others to question jury verdicts. As Saks emphasizes, one reason
for discounting the polls is the manipulation of public opinion through
the electoral process. Public officials, who can no longer count on the
backing of stable coalitions, no longer attempt to lead or to educate.
Their goal is short-term approval, and they seek issues that promise
immediate payoffs and that already have strong public support. These
politicians please whom they must to obtain the money to purchase
television time; they hire experts to tell them how to push our hot
buttons; then they push them.14 As Saks notes, similar competitive
pressures lead the media to emphasize the immediate and engaging
rather than the informative and educational. 15
Money does not just talk in the political process; it screams. And
money is increasingly influential in the courtroom as well. Trial law-
yers now attempt to program and maneuver jurors in the same sorts of
ways that candidates for public office seek to maneuver voters. When
clients have enough money, these lawyers hire consultants to survey
community attitudes and to determine which demographic character-
istics indicate favorable jurors. They draft pages of complex, multiple-
part questions probing attitudes, histories, beliefs, memberships, driv-
ing records, criminal records, reading habits, viewing habits, and
more, and judges order prospective jurors to answer these privacy-
invading questions upon penalty of perjury.
The courts then give the lawyers an opportunity that the politicians
must envy. In the most engaging lawyers' contest of all-one in which
every lawyer considers herself a world-class player-each side tries to
stack the tribunal in her favor. A familiar wisecrack is that in England
the trial begins when the jury is selected;16 in America, that is when
the trial is over. Because the trial is not truly over, however, lawyers
13. Saks, supra note 1, at 241. Stephen Adler comments, "We love the idea of the jury but
hate the way it works." ADLER, supra note 8, at xiii.
14. Political scientists say that we live in the time of the "plebiscite Presidency." See THEO-
DORE J. Lowi, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE UNFULFILLED 97 (1985).
15. Saks, supra note 1, at 232.
16. The criminal trial, that is. England has virtually abolished the civil jury.
[Vol. 48:407
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sometimes hire shadow juries to observe the proceedings and debrief
the lawyers at the end of each court day.
The founder of America's largest jury consulting firm tells lawyers
not to attempt to change jurors' opinions with evidence and argument
but instead to "'anticipate which of the jurors' basic beliefs are consis-
tent with, and which conflict with, various views of the case. The law-
yer should adopt a view . . . linked to the jurors' attitudes . . .
consistent with what the jurors already believe."17 Other consultants
suggest that "logic plays a minimal role" in advocacy and that a law-
yer's goal must be to find the jurors' "'psychological anchors.'"18 This
process is unlikely to inspire confidence. We sense that things are slip-
ping from our grasp and that well-funded experts truly can push our
buttons. Our democratic institutions are foundering, and the jury is
among them.
IV.
Fourth, the public has especially good reason for mistrusting dam-
age awards. Saks notes that the determination of damages attracts
more public criticism than any other jury task. He writes:
Survey respondents think jurors would benefit from more guidance
from judges. But respondents must be assuming that there is more
guidance to be given (and in believing that reveal further ignorance
about the law's goals and methods).
What might happen if respondents learned that the reason lay ju-
rors were asked to determine the amount to be awarded for general
damages was that the law recognizes the absence of markets for
such losses; that consequently there was an absence of any "objec-
tive" guidance on the value to be placed on such losses; and that the
only substitute for the values that would be provided by such a mar-
ket that anyone could think of was the community's estimate of the
value of such losses? A sample of the community-the jury-is in a
better position than any other decision-maker to say what these
losses were worth.19
Despite the absence of a market for criminal punishment, we have
managed to construct sentencing guidelines for judges.20 Judges need
these guidelines less than jurors need damages guidelines, for jurors
17. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY
153-54 (1994) (quoting Donald Vinson).
18. Id. at 153; see George Fisher, Review Essay: The 0. J. Simpson Corpus, 49 STAN. L. REV.
971, 993 (1997) ("As a medium, jury trials are hostle to subtlety. Young lawyers are taught to
wrap their cases around a theme and to drop nonconforming facts or contort them to make them
fit.").
19. Saks, supra note 1, at 228-29.
20. In the discussion that follows, I set aside the claim of economists that market measures
might in fact aid the assessment of damages for pain and suffering. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld,
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know nothing about past cases. They also lack the judges' ability to
attend conferences and to consult experienced colleagues.
Constructing damages guidelines would in fact be easier than con-
structing sentencing guidelines. Tort damages serve one clear, pri-
mary purpose, while criminal punishment serves many conflicting
purposes and may depend upon an assessment of innumerable circum-
stances including the offender's character. Damages, moreover, con-
sist simply of money. Unlike a sentencing commission, a "damages
commission" would not be required to draw lines among various types
of sanctions-fines, probation, community service, home detention,
boot camp, and prison. In England, the judiciary has developed rea-
sonably precise standards for damage awards,21 and if a "damages
commission" based its guidelines on past jury verdicts, these guide-
lines could reduce capriciousness while still reflecting community
sentiment.22
Jurors themselves sometimes resent their conscription as croupiers
in a damages casino. After awarding $8.5 million in a personal injury
case, one juror complained, "It was ridiculous to determine damages
without any guidelines. We did muddle through it, but we had no
clue."'23 I respect jurors and believe that this one was right. On this
issue, the public is right too.24
V.
Fifth, the public, although ill-informed on many issues, is not quite
as ignorant as Saks maintains. Saks attributes opinion poll results to a
"campaign against the civil jury" waged by insurance companies and
other profit-seeking business interests. He declares, "The problem is
that no effective countervailing information source exists .... "25
Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for
Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 773, 791-92 (1995).
21. See Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation With a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services
and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1827 n.80
(1986).
22. In Anglo-Saxon England, a system of "bots" specified the compensation owed for various
injuries, see HENRY ADAMS ET AL., ESSAYS IN ANGLO-SAXON LAW 271-73, 278-79 (London,
MacMillan 1876), and workers' compensation schemes provide schedules for financial awards
today. Damages guidelines might be administered in a substantially more flexible manner than
these precursors, for jurors could be instructed to depart from the guidelines when the guidelines
did not seem appropriate in the circumstances of particular cases.
23. ADLER, supra note 8, at 175.
24. For a fuller argument in favor of damages guidelines, see Edward J. McCaffrey et al.,
Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995).
25. Saks, supra note 1, at 234.
[Vol. 48:407
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I would like to introduce Saks to Robert Clifford and other mem-
bers of the personal-injury plaintiffs' bar. I hope someday he will
meet Ralph Nader. Opponents of the "campaign against the civil
jury" are not voiceless in America, the principal remaining bastion of
the civil jury, and I see no danger that the civil jury is about to
disappear.
Moreover, the public probably does not obtain its impressions of
juries primarily from the pronouncements of partisans in the tort re-
form debate. It probably reacts more to the verdicts in the trials it has
followed. These publicized trials are almost all criminal, but people
are unlikely to assume that the jury's performance in civil cases is very
different.
Some highly publicized verdicts allow the public to do what all of us
want to do-cheer the jury. One thinks of Timothy McVeigh, 0. J.
Simpson II (the civil trial), Rodney King II (the federal court trial),
and Eric and Lyle Menendez II (the retrial).2 6 Frequently, however,
jury verdicts are less reassuring. One thinks of 0. J. Simpson I (the
criminal trial), Rodney King I (the state court trial), Eric and Lyle
Menendez I (the mistrial), 27 Louise Woodward (the murder verdict),
Terry Nichols (the manslaughter verdict), and Marion Berry (the mis-
demeanor verdict). One also thinks of Oliver North, Damian Wil-
liams, Jack Kevorkian,2 8 Lorena Bobbitt, John Bobbitt, El-Sayyid
Nosair (the man acquitted of killing Meir Kahane in a verdict that the
presiding judge called "against the overwhelming weight of the evi-
dence and devoid of sense and logic"), 29 and Lemrick Nelson, Jr. (ac-
quitted of killing Yankel Rosenbaum although Rosenbaum had,
before dying, identified Nelson as his murderer and although the mur-
der weapon had been found in Nelson's possession). 30
In the cases of Nosair and Nelson, the juries' verdicts brought
thousands of protesters to the streets.31 Unlike most protesters, these
marchers had no agenda for change; they simply mourned the denial
of justice. Within the past decade, several other American jury ver-
dicts also have sparked public protests, and nothing like these protests
26. Note the Roman numerals. Our justice system often is able to get things right the second
time around.
27. Although this trial did not end in a verdict, some members of the two hung juries were
ridiculed for accepting the defendants' abuse excuse.
28. You may put as many Roman numerals after this case-name as you like. I am not sure,
however, that most of the public was troubled by the jury nullification that occurred in these
prosecutions.
29. See GEORGE FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME 85 (1995).
30. See id. at 86, 102.
31. See id. at 85, 103.
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has occurred anywhere else in the world.32 No other justice system-
at least none in any democratic nation-generates the same outrage
that ours does. On a number of occasions, moreover, the protests
have been violent. The initial Rodney King verdict led to the worst
race riot in American history-two days of civil disorder that claimed
fifty-eight lives and cost nearly one billion dollars in property dam-
age.33 The American jury system is distinctive in its ability to enrage
people. 34
When a jury verdict differs from our predilections, it is comforting
to say, "The jury heard much more of the evidence than we did. We
must have been wrong." This response has become increasingly diffi-
cult, however, in the age of Court TV and closely watched trials.
Mayor Tom Bradley of Los Angeles voiced the sentiments of many
when, following the Rodney King verdict, he said of the videotape
evidence in that case, "We saw what we saw. What we saw was a
crime. '' 35 The public today seems better informed about jury per-
formance than it was a few decades ago, and respect for the jury ap-
pears to be declining.
VI.
Sixth (my final point), the public may evaluate the jury on a more
sensible basis than many social scientists. I know the likely response
of many social scientists to what I just said. I have heard this response
before: "Tut, tut, good grief, and my heavens, man-those media cases
are not typical." Social scientists then may report that the typical jury
verdict in a criminal case does not acquit an obviously guilty defend-
ant, that the typical verdict does not depart from what the judge who
presided at the trial would have done, that the typical determination
of civil liability does not reflect pro-plaintiff sympathy, and that from a
sound economic perspective the typical jury-determined award of
damages does not overcompensate. That is all the social scientists
need to know.
Empiricists are mostly in the business of assessing the central ten-
dency-means, medians, modes, and typical cases. The information
they develop is useful and sometimes important. Too often, however,
the empiricists assume it is the only information that matters. I once
32. More accurately, these protests have occurred only after the conclusion of American tri-
als. Thousands of Jews in Israel took to the streets following the Nosair acquittal. Id. at 103.
33. See Neal R. Peirce, Look Homeward, City of Angels, 24 NAT'L L.J. 1250 (1992); Seth
Mydans, Prosecutor Seeks Retrial of Officer in King Beating, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1992, at A20.
34. In large part, this paragraph repeats a central thesis of FLETCHER, supra note 29.
35. Bill Boyarsky, Ashes of a Mayor's Dream, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at B2.
[Vol. 48:407
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heard a respected academic refer to even the deaths that followed the
Rodney King verdict as "merely anecdotal evidence." Without paus-
ing to consider when measures of the central tendency are useful and
when they are not, social scientists adopt a mode of thought that I
have called "the bottom-line, collectivist, statistical, empirical
mentality. 36
Like typical cases, atypical cases have serious consequences. One
verdict may prompt rioting in Miami, and another may lead to a com-
pany's bankruptcy or to the discontinuance of a possibly beneficial
product. Peter Huber uses the Bendectin cases as an illustration. 37
He maintains that Bendectin, an anti-nausea drug used during preg-
nancy, does not cause birth defects. Whether he is correct or not I
cannot say, but most of the juries that have considered the issue have
agreed with him. They have returned verdicts for the defendant again
and again.
Huber has no quarrel with the "typical" verdict in Bendectin cases
or with the performance of the overwhelming majority of jurors. A
few outlying verdicts against Bendectin's manufacturer, however-in
one case for $95 million-have made the average Bendectin award
$100,000. Huber writes, "Whichever side you believe on the toxicity
of Bendectin, a median jury verdict of $0, a mean of $100,000, and a
high verdict of $95 million cannot be just. '38
Apart from the fact that atypical cases have serious consequences,
evaluating institutions like the jury at the mid-point rather than the
margin is misguided. I propose an experiment. Make me Czar of the
American justice system and empower me to determine, among other
things, all civil damage awards. Allow me to make these awards with-
out regard to any rules of evidence, any rules of procedure, or any
substantive law, and subject my rulings to no review. Then, after a
year or so, conduct an empirical study.
I am a decent person, and I will try hard. Economists may discover
that my typical award does not overcompensate plaintiffs. Other so-
cial scientists may conclude that this award does not differ signifi-
cantly from those of the jurors who preceded me.
Accordingly, once the public gets beyond misleading media propa-
ganda and understands the hard empirical facts, it is likely to abandon
its reservations about Czar-administered justice. Indeed, because I
36. See Albert W. Alschuler, "Close Enough for Government Work": The Exclusionary Rule
After Leon, 1984 S. CT. REV. 309, 346.
37. Peter Huber, Junk Science and the Jury, 1990 U. CMi. LEGAL F. 273.
38. Id. at 285.
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will provide the same bottom-line statistics as juries at a fraction of
the cost, rational policy analysts ought to crown me Czar for life.
I am concerned, however, that social scientists may study the Iraqi
justice system too. They may discover in Baghdad that the typical
Iraqi tribunal does not treat the typical fender-bender differently from
the typical American tribunal. Upon learning of these research find-
ings, the public may be tempted to substitute Iraqi justice for mine
and the jury's. Yet an empirical finding that America and Iraq reach
similar results in typical cases would be mostly beside the point. Even
if every justice system resolved its typical cases perfectly, all justice
systems would not be just the same. Aggregating data and examining
the central tendency can be useful, but this methodology can hide
more than it reveals. Most legal procedures exist because we care
about atypical cases.
Evaluating an institution like the jury at the margin is difficult; there
is no scientific formula for doing it. Every enterprise conducted by
human beings fails on occasion and may generate some troubling sto-
ries. Condemning an institution like the jury simply on the basis of a
few horror stories would be as foolish as shunting all horror stories
aside on the ground they are atypical. One must ask again and again a
question that Saks emphasizes: Compared to what? When an institu-
tion seems to do poorly, would either a mildly or a radically reformed
institution be likely to do better? What costs and risks would the al-
ternatives pose?
Mixed questions of empirical and normative judgment are not ame-
nable to precise answers. In evaluating the jury, one person may cite
the O.J. Simpson verdict as a horror story while another cites it as a
triumph of popular justice. Even if our concepts of justice were alike,
moreover, we would rarely have sufficient experience with alternative
arrangements to answer the "compared to what" question
quantitatively.
In shaping and evaluating institutions, we cannot avoid messy spec-
ulation about counterfactual conditionals: Would the jury system work
better with damages guidelines or without them? Who would draft
the guidelines? What sources might these drafters consult? What
goals would they pursue? With luck, we might gain some insight from
experience elsewhere-English appellate decisions on damages or
American sentencing guidelines. In the end, however, we would draw
on a range of knowledge about our own psyches, about the behavior
[Vol. 48:407
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of other human beings, and about the effects of differing institutional
arrangements. We would make a holistic judgment.39
I suspect that the public understands the need to blend the norma-
tive and the empirical and to include in the mix anecdotes (especially
those that may illuminate the inherent characteristics of an institu-
tion), personal evaluations of specific outcomes, and quantitative re-
search. Most of the people who respond to opinion polls may not be
above average, but they do seem smarter than some social scientists.
39. "Holistic" is the academic word for "punt."
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